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MATTHEW C. WAXMAN

Syria, Threats of Force, and Constitutional War
Powers
In this Essay, Professor Matthew Waxman argues that debates about
constitutional war powers neglect the critical role of threats of war or force in
American foreign policy. The recent Syria case highlights the President’s vast legal
power to threaten military force as well as the political constraints imposed by
Congress on such threats. Incorporating threats into an understanding of
constitutional powers over war and peace upends traditional arguments about
presidential flexibility and congressional checks—arguments that have failed to keep
pace with changes in American grand strategy.
In August 2013, the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad launched a
major sarin gas attack against opponents and civilians inside Syria, flagrantly
crossing the “red line”—widely interpreted as an implicit threat to intervene
militarily in response to chemical weapons use—that President Obama had
previously declared and reiterated in public remarks.1 Amid widespread
suggestions that American credibility was now on the line, President Obama
responded on August 31 with two simultaneous announcements: first, he had
decided that the United States should respond militarily with limited strikes
against Syrian government targets; and, second, notwithstanding his insistence
that he had constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief to take that action
unilaterally, he would seek congressional approval to do so.2 The Obama
Administration then began an intensive lobbying campaign to convince

1.

2.

See Michael R. Gordon, Aim of U.S. Attack: Restore a ‘Red Line’ That Became Blurred, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 29, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/30/world/middleeast/aim-of-a-us
-attack-on-syria-sharpening-a-blurred-red-line.html.
Remarks on the Situation in Syria, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1-3 (Aug. 31, 2013).
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skeptical legislators and the public that following through on the proposed
military strike was necessary not only to deter further chemical weapons
attacks by Syrian government forces, but to deter the acquisition and use of
weapons of mass destruction by other hostile regimes and terrorist
organizations.3
Almost two hundred years earlier, another President drew a red line. In his
1823 address to Congress, President Monroe declared to European powers that
the United States would oppose any efforts to colonize or reassert control in
the Western Hemisphere.4 Monroe’s cabinet had been divided over the
wisdom of this implied threat—which the United States at the time lacked
capability to enforce without relying on British naval supremacy—but they
unanimously understood that military action against any European power that
crossed the line would constitutionally require congressional authorization.5
Monroe’s successor, John Quincy Adams, later faced complaints from
opposition members of Congress that Monroe’s proclamation had exceeded his
constitutional authority and had usurped Congress’s by committing the United
States—even in a non-binding way—to resisting European meddling in the
hemisphere.6
A lot changed during those two hundred intervening years. As a strategic
matter, the United States grew after World War II into a military superpower
with global interests and global security commitments. As a legal matter, the
President effectively asserted vast powers to use military force since then, too,
and neither Congress nor the courts have generally stood in his way. Every
student of American constitutional war powers learns that the Framers split
them between the political branches: the President is the chief executive and
Commander-in-Chief, but Congress has the power to raise and support a
military and to declare war. Most scholars interpret the original intent of this
division as giving Congress responsibility for deciding if and when the United
States should use military force (except for some narrow exceptions like
repelling an invasion) and giving the President responsibility for managing the
military operations authorized by Congress. At least as interpreted by the

3.
4.
5.

6.
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See Address to the Nation on the Situation in Syria, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2 (Sept.
10, 2013).
See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801-1829, at
207-09 (2001).
See 6 JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, COMPRISING PORTIONS OF
HIS DIARY FROM 1795 TO 1848, at 202-08 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Philadelphia, J.B.
Lippincott & Co. 1875).
See CURRIE, supra note 4, at 210-18.
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executive branch and as exercised in practice, the President now wields vast
unilateral discretion to use military force to protect U.S. interests.7
This basic story of American constitutional war powers—divided authority
evolving with the vast expansion of U.S. military power into unilateral
presidential authority—gives rise to several major debates among scholars and
commentators about the functional merits of different constitutional
allocations of power.8 One major dispute concerns what allocation of power
best helps to avoid unnecessary and costly wars. “Congressionalists”—or those
who favor tight legislative checks on the President’s authority to use force—still
rely heavily on logic, invoked by James Madison at the time of the Founding,
that the more flexibly the President can use military force, the more likely it is
that the United States will find itself in wars; better, therefore, to clog
decisions to make war with legislative checks.9 Their calls for reform usually
involve narrowing and better enforcement (by all three branches of
government) of purported constitutional requirements for congressional
authorization of presidential uses of force, or revising and enforcing the War
Powers Resolution or other framework legislation requiring express
congressional authorization for military actions.10 Modern “presidentialist”
legal scholars—or those who favor vast unilateral executive authority to use
force—usually respond that rapid action is a virtue, not a vice, in exercising

7.

8.
9.

10.

On this evolution, see generally JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY:
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 3-10 (1993) (describing the
original intention of the constitutional framers to place the power to go to war with
Congress, and the shift in the exercise of that power in the Cold War to the President); and
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 1-25 (1973) (recounting early
debates over the proper balance of executive and legislative war powers). But see John C.
Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers,
84 CALIF. L. REV. 167 (1996) (arguing that the original understanding of the Constitution
supports a very broad presidential authority to use force).
For a summary of these debates, see generally STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 11-51 (2013).
See ELY, supra note 7, at 3-4; Jules Lobel, The Relationship Between the Process and Substance of
the National Security Constitution, 15 YALE J. INT’L L. 360, 366-74 (1990) (reviewing HAROLD
HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRANCONTRA AFFAIR (1990)); Michael J. Glennon, The Gulf War and the Constitution, FOREIGN
AFF., Spring 1991, at 84, 87-88.
See, e.g., ELY, supra note 7, at 115-131; Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited War and
the Constitution: Iraq and the Crisis of Presidential Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 447, 496-500
(2011); Glennon, supra note 9, at 99-101; Deciding to Use Force Abroad: War Powers in a
System of Checks and Balances, CONST. PROJECT (2005), http://www.constitutionproject.org
/pdf/28.pdf; see also LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 261-81 (2d ed. 2004)
(discussing frequently raised objections to the War Powers Resolution).
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military force.11 Especially as a superpower maintaining global interests and
facing global threats, presidential discretion to take rapid military action—
wielded by a branch endowed with what Alexander Hamilton called
“[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch”12—best protects American interests.
Meanwhile, almost no attention has been devoted to an issue highlighted
by the Syria case: How does constitutional allocation of power affect the
United States’s ability to deter conduct inimical to American interests or to
resolve foreign crises by threatening force—that is, by communicating through
words and deeds the possible future use of armed violence to affect the
behavior of other actors, usually other states?13 This lack of attention to threats
of force and constitutional powers is ironic because, since World War II, such
threats have formed the backbone of U.S. grand strategy. The United States
has relied heavily on the manipulation of risk to deter aggression or other
actions by adversaries, to coerce or compel certain actions by other states or
international actors, to reassure allies, and to pursue other political designs
under the shadow of armed threats.14 When wars or large-scale force actually
have been used, it has been because a prior policy or strategy failed—for
instance, because deterrent threats were insufficiently credible, or crises
involving U.S. threats of force escalated in ways that were difficult to control.
In this regard, most of the time that U.S. military power is “used”—and often
when it is most successful—it does not manifest as a war or major military
engagement at all. If we are worried ultimately about avoiding wars through

11.
12.
13.

14.
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See, e.g., JOHN YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND 401-02 (2009); Eugene V. Rostow, President,
Prime Minister or Constitutional Monarch?, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 740, 741 (1989).
THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 128 (Alexander Hamilton) (Richard Beeman ed., 2012).
For some prior discussion of these issues, see Samuel Issacharoff, Political Safeguards in
Democracies at War, 29 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 189, 197 (2009) (arguing that democracies
may have more credibility than non-democracies in signaling intentions during crises,
thereby helping to avoid war); and Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional
Design, 115 YALE L.J. 2512, 2526-38 (2006) (recognizing the importance of signaling in
functional assessments of war powers allocations).
See generally BARRY M. BLECHMAN & STEPHEN S. KAPLAN, FORCE WITHOUT WAR: U.S.
ARMED FORCES AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT (1977) (analyzing the use of military force or the
threat thereof for political ends); DANIEL BYMAN & MATTHEW WAXMAN, THE DYNAMICS OF
COERCION: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LIMITS OF MILITARY MIGHT (2002)
(examining U.S. use of coercion as a geopolitical tool); JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, STRATEGIES OF
CONTAINMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY DURING
THE COLD WAR 90 (rev. ed. 2005) (“World order, and with it American security, had come
to depend as much on perceptions of the balance of power as on what that balance actually
was.”).
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constitutional design, we should be thinking about threats of war and the
Constitution.
In a forthcoming article, titled The Power to Threaten War,15 I consider in
detail the relationship between constitutional powers and strategies of
threatened force. This Essay highlights several critical aspects of that
relationship, especially as illustrated in the Syria case. In particular, it shows
that the President’s power to carry out threats is only half the story; the other
half is how distributions of constitutional power between the political branches
help or impede the President’s ability to issue effective threats.
When President Obama remarked in announcing his Syria decisions that
although he had the legal authority to take action without congressional
authorization, “our actions will be even more effective” by obtaining it,16 he
was probably correct in two narrow senses: yes, presidents have relied on
similar authority in the past,17 and yes, if Congress affirmatively backed his
actions at this stage, this military action would likely be more potent. But
would commitment—political commitment or even legal commitment—to
stronger congressional control over future U.S. decisions to intervene generally
enhance the credibility and effectiveness of American threats of force? It is such
future effects of any U.S. action, as the President himself acknowledged, that
are critical to American strategic interests, and they are also critical to
understanding the practical consequences of how constitutional war powers are
allocated.
i. constitutional powers and threats of force
These days it is usually taken for granted that—whether or not he can make
war unilaterally—the President is constitutionally empowered to threaten the
use of force, implicitly or explicitly, through diplomatic means or shows of

15.
16.
17.

123 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2014).
Remarks on the Situation in Syria, supra note 2, at 2.
Harold Koh argues that this action would be consistent with prior executive branch
precedent. See Harold Hongju Koh, Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention (Part I:
Political Miscues and U.S. Law), JUST SECURITY (Sept. 26, 2013, 4:30 AM),
http://justsecurity.org/2013/09/26/koh-syria. But see Jack Goldsmith, How Administration
Lawyers Are Probably Thinking About the Constitutionality of the Syria Intervention (And a Note
on the Domestic Political Dangers of Intervention), LAWFARE (Aug. 24, 2013, 11:59 AM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/08/how-administration-lawyers-are-probably-thinking
-about-the-constitutionality-of-the-syria-intervention-and-a-note-on-the-domestic
-political-dangers-of-intervention (arguing that this would be an unprecedented extension
of executive power).
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force. It is never seriously contested whether the President has full,
independent authority to, for example, proclaim that the United States is
contemplating military intervention in response to a crisis, or whether the
President may move substantial U.S. military forces to a crisis region or engage
in military exercises there.
From a constitutional standpoint, the President’s power to threaten force is
at least as broad as his power to use it. One way to think about it is that the
power to threaten force is a lesser-included element of presidential war powers;
the power to threaten to use force is simply a secondary question, the answer to
which is bounded by the President’s vast, primary authority to use force in
protecting U.S. national interests. Depending on how a particular threat is
communicated, it is likely to fall within even quite narrow interpretations of
the President’s inherent foreign relations powers to conduct diplomacy or his
express Commander-in-Chief power to control U.S. military forces—or some
combination of the two. A President’s verbal warning, ultimatum, or declared
intention to use military force, for instance, could be justified as merely
exercising his role as the “sole organ” of U.S. foreign diplomacy (at least so
long as he does not formally declare war), conveying externally information
about U.S. capabilities and intentions.18 A president’s movement of U.S. troops
or warships to a crisis region or elevation of their alert level could be justified as
merely exercising his day-to-day operational control over forces under his
command.19
This virtually unchecked executive authority to threaten force or war has
affected U.S. security and foreign policy in ways often neglected by legal
scholars, who tend to focus predominantly on actual wars and other hostile
engagements of U.S. forces abroad. The Korean and Vietnam Wars are
generally considered the most salient events of the Cold War for understanding
constitutional allocations of war powers, yet during that time frame presidents

18.

19.
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See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936); see also Dep’t of
the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988) (noting the Supreme Court has “recognized ‘the
generally accepted view that foreign policy was the province and responsibility of the
Executive’” (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293-94 (1981))); Saikrishna B. Prakash &
Michael D. Ramsey, Foreign Affairs and the Jeffersonian Executive: A Defense, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 1591, 1592-93 (2005) (arguing that diplomatic authority is vested in the executive
branch); Phillip R. Trimble, The President’s Foreign Affairs Power, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 750, 755
(1989) (noting that “the President has the exclusive power of official communication with
foreign governments”).
See Training of British Flying Students in the United States, 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 58, 62 (1941)
(Robert H. Jackson, Att’y Gen.). At various times, though, Congress has placed statutory
geographical restrictions on the deployment of U.S. forces. See Ackerman & Hathaway,
supra note 10, at 456.
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also unilaterally wielded threats of nuclear war to deter Soviet aggression, to
bargain, and to reassure allies, and they unilaterally (or sometimes with
congressional backing) resorted to small-scale shows of force on dozens of
occasions in pursuit of U.S. strategic interests. In the 1990s, U.S. presidents
wielded threats of force against dictators or militia leaders in places such as
Iraq, Haiti, and Bosnia—with varying effectiveness and prior to actual U.S.
military operations that attracted the attention of legal scholars. While legal
scholars have recently been focused on whether U.S. actions in Iraq and against
al Qaida affiliates reflect an imperial executive, presidents have been wielding
without direct legal constraint the threat of U.S. military force in East Asia—
for example, to deter North Korean aggression and signal to China and restive
U.S. allies American intentions to maintain regional security balances—in a
manner that is sometimes consistent with defense treaties and sometimes
outside them.20
The power to threaten force is significant not only for its influence in
provoking or defusing crises, and perhaps causing or preventing major wars,
but also because threats put American credibility and reputation for resolve on
the line, and thereby alter the interests and stakes involved in carrying them
out. Constitutional scholars often make much of the fact that Congress
ultimately authorized the 1991 Persian Gulf war and declined to authorize the
1999 Kosovo intervention—two of the most significant U.S. military
adventures following the end of the Cold War. It is important, however, to
understand those congressional decisions as a very late, not early, stage of a
decision tree. The President’s ability to threaten force was critically important
at earlier stages in determining whether that final stage would even occur at all,
and what policy payoffs would be associated with different choices.21 Once
President George H.W. Bush placed hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops in
the Persian Gulf region and issued an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein in 1990,
the credibility of U.S. threats and assurances to regional partners were put on
the line.22 In threatening force against Serbian President Slobodan Milošević
over the 1999 Kosovo crisis, President Clinton and allied leaders altered the

20.

21.

22.

See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 13-14 (2011), http://www.jcs.mil/content/files/2011-02/020811084800_2011_NMS
_-_08_FEB_2011.pdf; Jane Perlez, Cancellation of Trip by Obama Plays to Doubts of Asia Allies,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/05/world/asia/with-obama
-stuck-in-washington-china-leader-has-clear-path-at-asia-conferences.html.
Cf. Marc Trachtenberg, History Teaches, YALE J. INT’L AFF., Sept. 2012, at 23, 29-30 (arguing
that war should be viewed as an outcome of an extended political process that unfolds over
time).
See Glennon, supra note 9, at 93.

303

the yale law journal online

123:297

2013

strategic stakes by putting perceptions (among both allies and adversaries) of
collective NATO resolve on the line.23
In the Syria case, a major argument by executive branch officials lobbying
Congress to back military action was that failure to act would have deleterious
effects on U.S. capacity to deter hostile actions by Iran, North Korea, and other
possible adversaries.24 They also argued that failure to act, now that the
President had stated his intention to do so, would undermine U.S. allies’
confidence in American commitments to their defense.25 Many of the strongest
congressional supporters of military action made similar arguments to sway
their colleagues.26
Especially when taken together, these factors—the president’s vast legal
authority to make threats, the importance of threats to American security
strategy after World War II, and the difficulty of climbing down from threats
once they are made—might mean that the shift in powers of war and peace
since World War II from Congress to the President has been even more
dramatic than usually supposed, at least in terms of how formal congressional
checks are exercised. Political scientists have often observed, however, that
Congress wields considerable political clout over the President’s decision
whether to threaten force—and in ways that differ from Congress’s ability to
affect ultimate decisions to use force or ongoing military operations.

23.
24.

25.

26.
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See Henry A. Kissinger, Doing Injury to History, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 5, 1999, at 38.
See Chuck Hagel, U.S. Sec’y of Def., Statement on Syria Before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
(Sept. 3, 2013), available at http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1802;
John Kerry, U.S. Sec’y of State, Opening Remarks Before the United States Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations (Sept. 3, 2013), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/09
/212603.htm.
See Noah Bierman, Kerry Urges Congress to OK Strike, BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 1, 2013,
http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2013/09/01/secretary-state-john-kerry-says
-waiting-congress-makes-syria-response-more-powerful-cites-new-evidence-chemical
-attack/AJ9VpYr05WbvjxZfznGTRJ/story.html; Mira Rapp-Hooper, Do Chemical Weapons
Threaten US Extended Deterrence in Asia?, DIPLOMAT BLOG (Sept. 13, 2013),
http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/09/13/do-chemical-weapons-threaten-us
-extended-deterrence-in-asia.
See Jonathan Martin, Vote on Syria Sets Up Foreign Policy Clash Between 2 Wings of G.O.P.,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/03/us/politics/syria-vote-sets
-up-foreign-policy-clash-in-gop.html; Juliet Eilperin, McCain Says Rejecting Syria Resolution
Would Be ‘Catastrophic,’ WASH. POST: POST POLITICS (Sept. 2, 2013, 5:29 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/09/02/mccain-says
-rejecting-syria-resolution-would-be-catastrophic.
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Whereas most lawyers usually begin their analysis of the President’s and
Congress’s war powers by focusing on their formal legal authorities, political
scientists usually take for granted these days that the President is—in
practice—the dominant branch with respect to military crises and that
Congress wields its formal legislative powers in this area rarely or in only very
limited ways. Yet a major school of thought holds that Congress nevertheless
wields significant influence over decisions about force, and that this influence
extends to threatened force, so that Presidents generally refrain from threats
that would provoke strong congressional opposition. Even without any serious
prospect for legislatively blocking the President’s threatened actions, Congress
under certain conditions can loom large enough to force Presidents to adjust
their policies; when it cannot, congressional members can oblige the President
to expend lots of political capital.27
Political opponents in legislative bodies have a ready forum for registering
dissent to presidential policies of force through such mechanisms as floor
statements, committee oversight hearings, resolution votes, and funding
decisions.28 These official actions prevent the President from monopolizing
political discourse on decisions regarding military actions and thereby make it
difficult for the President to depart too far from congressional preferences with
regard to wielding threats of force.29
Political opponents within a legislature also have few electoral incentives to
collude in an executive’s bluff, and they are capable of expressing opposition to
a threatened use of force in ways that could expose the bluff to a threatened
adversary.30 Even without exercising formal legislative powers, members of
Congress can shape public debate in ways that affect perceptions of U.S.
resolve abroad. As William Howell and Jon Pevehouse explain, “Congress

27.

28.

29.
30.

WILLIAM G. HOWELL & JON C. PEVEHOUSE, WHILE DANGERS GATHER: CONGRESSIONAL
CHECKS ON PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS 223 (2007); see also DOUGLAS L. KRINER, AFTER THE
RUBICON: CONGRESS, PRESIDENTS, AND THE POLITICS OF WAGING WAR 285 (2010) (noting
that “members of Congress have historically engaged in a variety of actions from formal
initiatives, such as introducing legislation or holding hearings that challenge the President’s
conduct of military action, to informal efforts to shape the nature of the policy debate [about
military conflict]”).
See KENNETH A. SCHULTZ, DEMOCRACY AND COERCIVE DIPLOMACY 59-62 (2001). Some legal
scholars emphasize these levers of congressional influence over war decisions, too. See, e.g.,
Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126
HARV. L. REV. 411, 468 (2012).
See SCHULTZ, supra note 28, at 57.
See id. at 95-96.
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matters, and matters greatly,” not just to the decision to strike militarily but “to
a nation’s ability to credibly convey resolve to enemies and allies alike.”31
The strength of these congressional political constraints on presidential
threats of force is not well understood, and the Syria case demonstrates their
limits. It is impossible even to know with certainty Congress’s position on
whether to threaten Syria with military force over chemical weapons at the
time President Obama drew a red line—as a general matter, the sprawling
institutional structure of Congress and rarity of definitive collective
pronouncements make that impossible.32 President Obama’s difficulty in
securing congressional authorization to strike after the August 2013 Syrian gas
attacks suggests that the President may have underestimated congressional
wariness.33
An important question for understanding the practical consequences of war
power allocations, then, is whether greater legal constraints on presidential
decisions to use force—such as a much stricter requirement for legislative
authorization or stronger enforcement of the War Powers Resolution—would
indirectly limit even further the President’s actual flexibility in making and
wielding threats. Perhaps the marginal and indirect effect of stronger
congressional control of force would be substantial. However, the political
system already achieves some degree of interbranch checking.
ii. constitutional checks and credible threats
Whereas legal scholars are usually consumed with the internal effects of
war powers law on actors within the U.S. government, the Syria case
highlights a question about their possible external effects: how, if at all, does
the legal allocation of power between the President and Congress affect the
credibility of U.S. threats among adversaries, allies, and other international
actors? In prescriptive terms, if the President’s power to use force is linked to
his ability to threaten it effectively, then any consideration of the impact of war
powers reform on policy outcomes and long-term interests should include the
important secondary effects on deterrent and coercive strategies—and on how

31.
32.
33.
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HOWELL & PEVEHOUSE, supra note 27, at xi.
Cf. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 28, at 438-47.
See Peter Baker, Russian Proposal Could Offer Obama Escape from Bind, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9,
2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/10/world/middleeast/surprise-russian-proposal
-catches-obama-between-putin-and-house-republicans.html; Mark Landler & Jonathan
Weisman, Obama Delays Syria Strike to Focus on a Russian Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/11/world/middleeast/syrian-chemical-arsenal.html.
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U.S. legal doctrine is observed and understood abroad.34 Would stronger
requirements for congressional authorization to use force reduce a president’s
opportunities for bluffing, and, if so, would this improve U.S. coercive
diplomacy by making ensuing threats more credible? Or would it undermine
diplomacy, including deterrence of adversaries and reassurance of allies, by
taking some threats off the table as viable policy options? Would stronger
formal legislative powers with respect to force have significant marginal effects
on the ability to signal abroad dissent within Congress, beyond that already
resulting from open American political discourse?
Intuitively, greater congressional veto power over the use of force would
seem generally to undermine the credibility of threats. For this reason, it has
long been assumed that democracies are at a disadvantage relative to
autocracies when it comes to threats of force and saber-rattling bargaining
contests under the shadow of possible war. Quincy Wright speculated in 1942
that autocracies “can use war efficiently and threats of war even more
efficiently” than democracies,35 especially democracies like the United States, in
which vocal public and congressional opposition may undermine threats.36
Additional, formal legal powers over war or force in the hands of Congress
would, it might seem, further disable the President from wielding threats
effectively, because opponents and other players in the international system
might doubt not only his willingness but his ability to carry them out. This was
a common policy argument during the War Powers Resolution debates in the
early 1970s. Eugene Rostow, an advocate inside and outside the government
for executive primacy, remarked during consideration of legislative drafts that
serious restrictions on presidential use of force would mean that, in practice,
“no President could make a credible threat to use force as an instrument of
deterrent diplomacy, even to head off explosive confrontations.”37 This view
holds that the merits of Madisonian “clogging” with regard to waging

34.

35.
36.
37.

One of the few pieces of legal scholarship to engage in this sort of analysis is Nzelibe & Yoo,
supra note 13 (arguing that credible signaling is an important element of rational
constitutional design of war powers). For a critique, see Paul F. Diehl & Tom Ginsburg,
Irrational War and Constitutional Design: A Reply to Professors Nzelibe and Yoo, 27 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 1239 (2006).
QUINCY WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 847 (1942).
See id. at 842.
Eugene V. Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TEX. L. REV. 833, 838
(1972).
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eighteenth century wars are liabilities with regard to deterring twentieth and
twenty-first century wars.38
The Syria case would seem to bear out these concerns. By giving Congress
a vote, the President appears not only to have tied his own hands in carrying
out his threat, but to have tipped off American rivals and partners that
congressional support for new military actions (for which the President might
also seek congressional authorization) is generally frail.
On the other hand, some recent strands of political science have called into
question the value of presidential flexibility in wielding threats. Some of this
work concludes that the institutionalization of political debate in democracies
makes threats to use force rare but especially credible and effective in resolving
international crises without resort to actual armed conflict.
In other words, recent arguments turn some old claims about the strategic
disabilities of democracies on their heads. Whereas it used to be generally
thought that democracies were ineffective in wielding threats because they are
poor at keeping secrets and their decision-making is constrained by internal
political pressures, a current wave of scholarship in political science accepts this
basic description but argues that these democratic features are really strategic
virtues.39 If that view is correct, a question for constitutional scholars is how,
specifically, legal doctrine and allocations of power strengthen or weaken these
features.
Some political scientists argue that democracies are less likely to bluff
because transparency makes it harder to do so.40 To the extent that adversaries
and allies understand this, threats will seem more serious than bluster.
Informational asymmetries also increase the potential for misperception and
thereby make some wars more likely; war, consequentially, can be thought of
in these cases as a “bargaining failure,” and greater transparency about
American policy preferences may help avoid unnecessary escalation of crises.41
For the reasons discussed in the previous section, legislative politics may
already contribute to this credibility-enhancing and conflict-avoiding
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transparency.42 Perhaps stricter legal requirements for congressional approval
of military action would push even more information about American political
and policy inclinations to the surface and into the open. For example, turning
more media attention to congressional opinion and elevating the significance of
congressional hearings or other maneuvers might make it more difficult to
conceal or misrepresent American preferences about war and peace with regard
to specific crises or threats. Moreover, especially if presidentialists are correct
about the importance of flexibility to credibility, in a hypothetical world of very
stringent congressional force-authorization requirements, Congress might be
inclined to delegate or pre-authorize some discretion back to the President.
As mentioned above, political transparency stemming from congressional
debate about Syria strikes likely weakened the President’s coercive leverage
abroad rather than strengthening it. But, for those interested in whether
stronger inter-branch checks are inherently disadvantageous to strategies of
threatened force, an important question is whether, ex ante, a legal
requirement for congressional approval to launch strikes would have caused
the President to be more cautious in drawing a red line to begin with and, if he
did so, would have made any threat backing it especially credible in the eyes of
intended audiences abroad.
conclusion: the constitution and american grand
strategy
The recent Syria case has inspired much discussion about constitutional
war powers and much discussion about the credibility of threats. Those two
conversations should be combined because the issues are tightly linked.43
Lawyers think “war powers” are about making war or conducting military
operations. They therefore examine wars and military operations to describe
how war powers are exercised and they often defend various interpretations of
these powers with functional arguments about how best to wage war or
conduct military operations. Focusing on decisions to use force—the actual
engagement of military operations in armed violence—and formal legal
constraints on them misses the many decision points that lead up to them. War
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powers decisions—in a practical sense, not a formal sense—occur earlier along
the foreign policy decision tree than is generally acknowledged or understood
in legal debates. Because the United States is a superpower that plays a major
role in sustaining global security, its ability to threaten war is in some respects
a much more policy-significant constitutional power than its power to actually
make war.
Despite the intense emphasis on it in discussions of foreign policy,
knowledge of how states acquire, maintain, or lose credibility to use force
remains severely limited.44 In thinking about the future of American
constitutional war powers, legal scholars need to update their thinking about
the strategic virtues of deliberative checks versus presidential flexibility to
better account for what is known and is not known about these phenomena.
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